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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-3842
___________
DARIN JONES,
Appellant
v.
COUNTY JAIL C.F.C.F.; SUPERINTENDENT OF C.F.C.F.;
MEDICAL SUPERVISOR 11pm-7am 2/18/13;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS on A-1-1 Unit 11pm-7am 2/18/13
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-02366)
District Judge: Honorable Joel M. Slomsky
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 2, 2015
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 30, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Darin Jones, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District
Court’s order dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
Jones claimed a violation of his Eighth Amendment right, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, and common law negligence against various officers and a medical supervisor at
Curran-Frumhold Correctional Facility (“CFCF”) in Philadelphia, stemming from
injuries he sustained falling from the top bunk of his cell. According to the complaint,
Jones’s cell did not have a ladder or step so that he could safely climb to the top bunk.
As a result thereof, while trying to climb down from his bunk, Jones fell, hitting his head
and knocking himself unconscious. Jones was evaluated by the medical staff and
administered pain killers and an ice pack. Thereafter, Jones was discharged and escorted
back to his cell. The next day, Jones was transferred from CFCF to the State Correctional
Institute in Graterford, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Graterford”).1 There, Jones again received a
medical exam, after which his wrist was x-rayed and he was again prescribed pain
medication. Jones alleged that “he continues to suffer from constant headaches and
extreme and sometimes sever[e] pain in his left wrist,” which did not exist prior to his
fall. The District Court dismissed Jones’s complaint because it failed to allege facts
evidencing a constitutional violation. Jones now appeals the dismissal of his complaint.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the federal claims. Lake
v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). We must “accept as true
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the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from them.” Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). We may summarily affirm
the decision of the District Court if no substantial question is presented on appeal. See
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
We agree with the District Court that Jones’s complaint does not state a claim
because he fails to allege facts sufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation.
To plead an Eighth Amendment claim based on conditions-of-confinement, Jones
must show that he was subjected to a sufficiently serious deprivation that resulted in the
denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and that officials at CFCF
were “deliberately indifferent” to Jones’s safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1983) (“To be cruel and unusual
punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than
ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.”) Similarly, to plead an
Eighth Amendment claim based on insufficient medical care, Jones must demonstrate
that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also White v. Napolean, 897 F.2d 103, 108 (3d Cir.
1990) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103) (“Only ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain’ or ‘deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs’ of prisoners are sufficiently
egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”). Eighth Amendment liability
cannot be based on simple negligence or lack of due care. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-37;
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Jones does not name SCI-Graterford or any official at the institution in his complaint.
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see also Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (“It is well-settled that
claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind,
do not constitute ‘deliberate indifference.’”). Here, the allegations contained in the
complaint, taken as true, fail to establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent
to the conditions of Jones’s cell or to his health, after his fall. On the contrary, Jones
alleged that he received immediate medical attention after the fall and was given both
medication and an ice pack to treat his injuries.2 Moreover, Jones did not allege that he
ever complained of or let officials at CFCF know that he was having difficulty climbing
to and from the top bunk. At its most generous reading, Jones’s complaint alleged mere
negligence, and not deliberate indifference, in CFCF’s failure to provide a step-ladder
and in its treatment of Jones’s injuries following the fall. And negligence is insufficient
to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the District Court properly
dismissed Jones’s Eighth Amendment claim.
While the District Court gives no explicit explanation for its dismissal of Jones’s
common law negligence claim, we interpret the dismissal as the District Court’s
declination to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). As we conclude that the District Court
properly dismissed the federal claims, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the District
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Jones allegations relating to his treatment at SCI-Graterford are not relevant to his
complaint, as Jones does not name either SCI-Graterford or any official at SCI-Graterford
as a party to this complaint.
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Court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the state negligence claim. See
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel, Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir.
1999). Finally, District Courts are required to grant leave to amend complaints unless
such amendment would be futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108
(3d Cir. 2002). For the reasons set forth above, any amendment would have been futile.
For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that the appeal presents no substantial
question. We will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court, and deny as moot
Jones’s motion for appointment of counsel.
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